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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: DEFINING
COMPLEMENTARITY AND DIVINING IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE UNITED STATES
Julie B. Martint
I. Introduction
The United States has consistently objected to potential International Criminal
Court ("ICC") jurisdiction over U.S. citizens, citing concerns that the ICC could
be used as a tool for political prosecutions' and that its jurisdiction would extend
to the president and other government officials.2 Although the ICC operates
under the principle of complementarity, by which it will assert jurisdiction only if
a state is unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute an alleged crime itself,3
the concerns of the United States remain strong.
This article addresses the validity of these concerns by examining complemen-
tarity in the context of two current events: the ICC investigation in the Sudan
and the allegations of detainee abuse in Iraq. Part II reviews the ICC Office of
the Prosecutor's treatment of complementarity in its investigation of war crimes
and crimes against humanity in the Darfur region of the Sudan. Part III attempts
to apply this working definition of complementarity to the allegations of detainee
abuse by U.S. forces in Iraq and the ICC's potential jurisdiction over the govern-
ment and military officials responsible for command of those forces. In so doing,
this article analyzes whether the protections of complementarity are sufficient to
allay U.S. concerns over the possibility of its officials falling within the Court's
jurisdiction. It concludes that while the risk of ICC intervention in the immediate
controversy over detainee abuse is negligible, an ICC determination that the
United States is unable or unwilling genuinely to investigate or prosecute high-
ranking government and military officials is theoretically possible and potentially
warranted should the U.S. government not conduct its own thorough and inde-
pendent investigation that reaches all levels of command.
II. Complementarity and the International Criminal Court
The ICC is the first and only permanent international criminal tribunal. The
Court is empowered to prosecute crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity,
t Adjunct Professor of Scholarly Writing, The George Washington University Law School; Law
Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. The ideas and comments expressed herein
are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces. The author extends sincere appreciation to Professor Sean D. Murphy of The George
Washington University Law School for his advice and comment in crafting this article.
I President's Statement on the Rome Treaty on the International Criminal Court, 37 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 4 1 4, 6 (Dec. 31, 2000).
2 22 U.S.C. § 7421(9) (2004).
3 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 1, 17, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
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war crimes, and the yet to be defined crime of aggression.4 Though the ICC was
only recently established in 2002, one hundred countries are State Parties to its
implementing treaty, the Rome Statute, 5 and states have widely accepted its defi-
nitions of crimes as codification of existing customary law. 6 This section pro-
vides a brief overview of provisions of the Rome Statute relevant to the Court's
functions and the role of complementarity. It then focuses on the ICC Office of
the Prosecutor's application of the complementarity principle to the conflicts in
the Sudan's Darfur region.
A. Key Provisions of the Rome Statute
Articles of the Rome Statute relevant to this inquiry relate to jurisdiction, com-
plementarity, and admissibility. Components of all three provisions must be sat-
isfied before the ICC can hear a particular matter. A case can be brought before
the Court through one of three procedures: referral by a State Party;7 initiation of
an investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor ("OTP");8 and referral by the
United Nations Security Council. 9 To establish jurisdiction over a case referred
by a State Party or initiated by the OTP, the state in whose territory the alleged
crime was committed or the state of the alleged offender's nationality must be
party to the Rome Statute or must have agreed to jurisdiction in the particular
case.10 There is no such requirement for a case referred by the Security
Council. I 1
Complementarity is the central component of the ICC's operation. This prin-
ciple awards primacy of jurisdiction to a state's national courts unless the ICC
determines the state "unwilling or unable genuinely to prosecute."1 2 Comple-
4 Id. art. 5.
5 International Criminal Court: About the Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/about.html (last visited Mar.
27, 2006).
6 Antonio Cassese, Crimes Against Humanity, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIM-
INAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 356, 373-74 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds.,
2002).
7 Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 13(a), 14.
8 Id. arts. 13(c), 15.
9 Id. art. 13(b).
10 Id. art. 12.
I Id. art 13(b).
12 Id. art. 17(2).
In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider, having regard
to the principles of due process recognized by international law, whether one or more of the
following exist, as applicable: (a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national
decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibil-
ity for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5; (b) There has been an
unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to
bring the person concerned to justice; [or] (c) The proceedings were not or are not being con-
ducted independently or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in
the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
Id. art. 17(3).
In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a
total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to
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mentarity is recognized in the Preamble to the Rome Statute, and Article I ex-
plicitly states that the Court's jurisdiction shall be complementary to that of
national jurisdictions. 13 The OTP has described the ICC as a "last resort court"
which will only intervene where no national investigation or prosecution has
been or is being conducted, or where such national investigation or prosecution is
"vitiated by an unwillingness or inability."' 14
Admissibility before the ICC based on inability or unwillingness is determined
on a case-by-case basis. 15 The ICC's aim is to ensure that the most egregious
crimes are punished, and its investigations center on identifying and prosecuting
those who bear the greatest responsibility for those crimes. Thus, the ICC does
not recognize sovereign immunity for officials 16 and provides that charges may
arise from breach of command responsibility. 17 Crimes punishable under the
Rome Statute are not restricted by a statute of limitations.' 8
These provisions significantly narrow the ICC's ability to hear cases. How-
ever, once a situation is deemed admissible, the Court's investigatory powers are
quite broad. The OTP's investigation of crimes in Darfur offers a glimpse into
the prosecutor's application of complementarity to find that the Sudan is unable
or unwilling to investigate and potentially prosecute those most responsible for
the atrocities in Darfur.
B. Application of the Complementarity Principle to the Investigation in
Darfur
On March 31, 2005, the Security Council referred the situation in Darfur to the
ICC, marking the first exercise of its power of referral. 19 Darfur has been an
international concern since late 2002, when a conflict began between govern-
ment-sponsored militias and resistance groups. 20 Primarily a dispute between the
African farmers who possess land in the Darfur region and the government and
Arabic nomadic tribes, including a government-sponsored militia called the
Janjaweed who seek control over that land, the conflict in Darfur has cost
obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its
proceedings.
Id. art. 17(3).
13 Id. art. 1.
14 Luis MORENO-OCAMPO, REPORT OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT TO
THE SECURITY COUNCIL PURSUANT To S.C. RES. 1593, at 3 (June 29, 2005) [hereinafter FIRST REPORT].
Referencing the ICC's complementary jurisdiction, ICC Judge Hans-Peter Kaul has stated that "[t]he lack
of criminal proceedings before the ICC, if it results from the effective functioning of national systems,
should be seen as a major success." Hans-Peter Kaul, Construction Site For More Justice: The Interna-
tional Criminal Court After Two Years, 99 Am. J. INT'L L. 370, 374 (2005).
15 FIRST REPORT, supra note 14, at 4.
16 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 27.
17 Id. art. 28.
18 Id. art. 53(4).
19 S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
20 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry
on Darfur, delivered to the Security Council pursuant to S.C. Res., 1564, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 of 18 Sep.
2004, at 22-23 (Jan. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Commission Report].
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thousands of lives and has displaced over 200,000 refugees. 2' Allegations of
crimes committed during this continuing conflict are quite serious: both sides are
accused of the targeted killing of civilians, torture, and systematic rape of women
and girls. 22
Upon receiving the Security Council's referral, the OTP, led by Prosecutor
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, quickly commenced an investigation into the alleged
atrocities.23 By the time of his June 29, 2005 report to the Security Council, the
prosecutor was able to conclude that there exists "a significant amount of credi-
ble information disclosing the commission of grave crimes within the jurisdiction
of the Court" as war crimes or crimes against humanity.2 4 Next, the OTP ex-
amined whether any of the identified crimes would be admissible before the ICC
under the complementarity principle.25 It concluded that cases against individu-
als bearing the greatest responsibility for the atrocities would likely be admissible
before the ICC. 26
Because the OTP investigators have thus far been unable to conduct indepen-
dent investigations on the ground in Darfur, they necessarily based their conclu-
sions on secondary sources. There is no public record of the materials the OTP
reviewed in its admissibility assessment. Thus, this section considers other pub-
lic accounts of the conflict in Darfur in its attempt to identify factors that were
pertinent in the OTP's assessment. As indicated in Prosecutor Moreno-
Ocampo's report to the Security Council, the OTP appears to have focused on
three particular factors: (i) structure of and access to the national judicial system;
(ii) independent and impartial investigation or national prosecution with regard to
particular crimes or suspects; and (iii) status of the alleged offender.2 7 The first
two factors are somewhat intertwined as they apply to findings of ability and
willingness. While recognizing their interrelated nature, this article attempts to
clarify the functionality of the national judicial system as a critical aspect of
ability and the existence of independent and impartial national investigations and
prosecutions as a function of willingness.
1. Ability: Structure of and Access to the National Judicial System
The first factor of importance in the OTP's admissibility review is the struc-
ture of the national judicial system and access to that system as a means of re-
dress or punishment. The Rome Statute provides that a state may be deemed
21 Estimates indicate that between 70,000 and 400,000 people have died during the conflict. Colum
Lynch, Lack of Access Muddies Death Toll in Darfur, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2005, at A20, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.conwp-dyn/articles/A6186-2005Feb7.html; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, EN-
TRENCHING IMPUNITY: GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN DARFUR n.3
(2005), http://hrw.org/reports/2005/darfur1205/darfur1205text.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2006) [hereinafter
ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY].
22 Commission Report, supra note 20, at 3.
23 ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 21, at 56.
24 Id.
25 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(I)(b).
26 FIRST REPORT, supra note 14, at 3-4.
27 Id.
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unable to investigate or prosecute alleged crimes when "due to a total or substan-
tial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to
obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable
to carry out its proceedings. 2 8
Though its constitution established the judiciary as autonomous entity, Su-
dan's judicial system has at best been marginalized by the government, if not
made totally ineffective in the years leading up to the current conflict.29 The
constitution provides a detailed organizational structure for the Sudanese court
system that gives enormous power to the chief justice of the Supreme Court.30
For instance, the chief justice is empowered to create and define the jurisdiction
of the lower public courts and town courts. 3' Yet, despite the constitutional allo-
cation of this power to the chief justice, President Omar Hassan El-Bashir has
established his own temporary tribunals to hear specific cases stemming from the
Darfur conflict. 32 With regard to the cases that remain in the constitutionally
established judicial system, reports that judges who disagree with the government
are often harassed and dismissed from their positions illustrate the government's
efforts to hamper the courts' ability to function independently and objectively. 33
President El-Bashir has also issued decrees denying citizens their due process
rights, such as access to counsel and the right to be present at trial, thereby fur-
ther vitiating the ability of the traditional courts to conduct proceedings that com-
port with international standards. 34
Thus, under this first factor, the structure of the Sudanese judicial system is
riddled with problems that could create ICC jurisdiction. The president's control
over the judiciary and the government's responsibility for authorizing and com-
mitting serious offenses against its citizens in Darfur create an environment in
which the judiciary is unable to operate independently and effectively, rendering
it unavailable to most victims of government-sponsored crimes. There is, there-
fore, a strong factual basis for the OTP's finding that complementarity does not
bar its investigation of high-ranking government, militia, and rebel leaders due to
an inability of the national courts to hear such cases. 35
28 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(3).
29 Commission Report, supra note 20, at 111 (referencing the Sudan's constitution of 1998).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 112.
33 Id. at 111.
34 Id. at 113-14 (discussing in particular the 1991 Criminal Procedure Code and the Security Forces
Act of 1999).
35 Luis MORENO-OCAMPO, SECOND REPORT OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO S.C. RES. 1593, at 4-6 (Dec. 13, 2005) [hereinafter SECOND
REPORT].
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2. Willingness: Independent and Impartial Investigation or National
Prosecution with Regard to Particular Crimes or Suspects
In addition to the judicial system's inability to exercise its full powers, the
government may be found unwilling to investigate and prosecute crimes on a
case-by-case basis. 36 Under the Rome Statute, unwillingness to genuinely inves-
tigate or prosecute occurs in the following situations: a state fails to conduct
proceedings or proceedings are conducted for the purpose of shielding individu-
als from prosecution by other tribunals; proceedings lack independence and im-
partiality, and are otherwise inconsistent with bringing an offender to justice; or
there is an unjustified delay in the proceedings evidencing a lack of intent to
bring an offender to justice.37
a. National Investigations
The Sudanese government conducted one national investigation that warrants
discussion in terms of its genuine willingness to investigate and, if necessary,
prosecute offenders. The National Commission of Inquiry ("National Commis-
sion") was established by President El-Bashir in May 2004 to investigate five
specified crimes: "bombing civilians in the context of the Geneva Conventions;
killings [in combat]; extrajudicial killings; rape as a crime against humanity; and
forcible transfer and ethnic cleansing. ' 38 The National Commission examined a
large amount of evidence pointing to grave human rights abuses from a wide
variety of sources, including personal interviews, reports of the United Nations
and human rights organizations, and findings of other governments. 39 Thus, in
the words of the UN-appointed International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
("UN Commission"), which reported on the situation in Darfur to the Security
Council, the National Commission "was fully aware of the serious allegations of
the crimes committed in Darfur.' '40 Yet, with clear evidence to the contrary, the
National Commission concluded that any crimes committed in Darfur were the
result of tribal conflicts and rebel activities, and that they were not grave enough
or sufficiently widespread or systematic to qualify as crimes of international con-
cern under the Rome Statute.4 1
In rejecting these findings, the UN Commission stated that:
[T]he report attempts to justify the violations rather than seeking effective
measures to address them .... [T]he National Commission was under
enormous pressure to present a view close to the Government's version of
events. The report of the National Commission provides a glaring exam-
36 Id.
37 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(2).
38 Commission Report, supra note 20, at 115.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 118. Under the Rome Statute, an act must be widespread or systematic to qualify as a crime
against humanity. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 7.
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pie of why it is impossible under the current circumstances in the Sudan
for a national body to provide an impartial account of the situation in
Darfur, let alone recommend effective measures. 42
The UN Commission dismissed the National Commission's conclusions as
questionable because of its lack of independence from, and lack of impartiality
toward, the Sudanese government, a component of willingness specifically set
forth in the Rome Statute.43 In making its admissibility assessment with regard
to particular cases, the OTP weighed independence and impartiality carefully, 44
though it is by no means clear that the OTP used the UN Commission Report as a
source for its conclusions. However, using the UN Commission Report as an
illustration of a reasonable assessment of the Sudan's willingness to investigate
establishes a potential basis for the OTP's conclusion that the Sudan is unwilling
to genuinely investigate.
b. National Prosecutions
In addition to grounds for finding fault with the Sudanese national investiga-
tion, the OTP also found a sufficient basis on which to conclude that national
courts are unwilling genuinely to prosecute those who have committed grave
offenses in Darfur.4 5 In addition to the president's tribunals discussed in the
previous section, in 2003, the chief justice of Sudan's Supreme Court established
a system of specialized courts to hear cases stemming from the Darfur conflict
that are of interest to the government.46 These specialized courts have jurisdic-
tion over only a small number of criminal offenses, such as robbery, banditry,
crimes against the state, and possession of unlicensed firearms.4 7 Although they
are intended to address crimes committed in the Darfur conflict, the specialized
courts do not hear cases concerning physical assault, enforced disappearances
and displacement, and rape-the most serious charges consistently alleged
against government and Janjaweed forces.48
Further, prosecutors rarely bring allegations of misconduct by the nomadic
tribes operating in conjunction with government forces, 4 9 and there are allega-
tions that the government is using these specialized courts as tools against citi-
zens suspected of being members of the rebel opposition groups.50 The UN
Commission witnessed and recorded statements of significant due process viola-
tions in the specialized courts, such as the failure to ensure that confessions made
42 Commission Report, supra note 20, at 118.
43 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(2).
44 FIRST REPORT, supra note 14, at 4.
45 SECOND REPORT, supra note 35, at 4-6.
46 Commission Report, supra note 20, at 118.
47 Id. at 112.
48 Id. at 3.
49 Id.
50 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SUDAN: THE SPEMCALISED CRIMINAL COURTS IN DARFUR (2004), http://
web.amnesty.orglibrary/index/ENGAFR541542004 (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
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under torture or duress are excluded from proceedings and denial of the right to
counsel. 5 1 Because these courts lack fundamental safeguards and because trials
are conducted summarily and primarily against only the Africans, the UN Com-
mission concluded that the specialized courts are incapable of providing adequate
trial protections to the accused and redress to victims. 52 In its recommendation
that the Security Council refer the Darfur conflict to the ICC, the UN Commis-
sion also recommended closure of the specialized courts. 53
In examining the OTP's complementarity assessment in light of the findings of
the UN Commission, it is clear that some cases could be admissible in the ICC
due to the unwillingness of the Sudanese government and judiciary to provide
redress for crimes that come within the ICC's jurisdiction. 54 Because the OTP
evaluates complementarity with regard to each individual it contemplates prose-
cuting, the status of the alleged offender is an important final consideration in
determining whether the state is able or willing to investigate and prosecute.
3. The Status of the Alleged Offender
The ICC was established to ensure that the most culpable perpetrators of egre-
gious crimes are brought to justice. As with other international tribunals, the ICC
may rely on national courts to try lesser perpetrators. 55 This system of operation
is reflected in the OTP's July 2005 address to the Security Council, wherein
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo stated that the purpose of the investigation is "twin
tracked."156 First, the OTP would focus on investigating individuals who bear the
greatest responsibility for crimes committed in Darfur. 57 Second, the Sudanese
courts and courts of other states with jurisdiction would be encouraged to assist
in bringing other offenders to justice. 58
In making its complementarity assessment concerning particular cases, the
OTP must consider whether each potential defendant could successfully be inves-
tigated and potentially prosecuted in national courts.59 Because the Sudanese
national courts are not investigating or prosecuting high-level government offi-
cials or Janjaweed militia leaders, the activity of the national courts is not a bar to
51 Commission Report, supra note 20, at 112. The Commission reasoned that "[tihe fact that the
specialized courts apply principally to the Darfur States and Kordofan, rather than to the whole of Sudan,
calls into question the credibility and reliability of these courts. The purpose of the courts is too glaring
to miss." Id. at 113.
52 Id. at 145.
53 Id. at 113, 145.
54 In his Second Report to the United Nations, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo concluded that the Spe-
cial Court investigations do not "suggest that cases likely to be prosecuted before the International Crimi-
nal Court would be inadmissible ...." SECOND REPORT, supra note 35, at 6.
55 See generally Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia art. 9, May
3, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1159; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 8, Nov. 8, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1598.
56 FIRST REPORT, supra note 14, at 10.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(3).
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ICC jurisdiction. 60 In making this assessment, the OTP stated that "[it is impor-
tant to emphasize that this decision [finding admissibility] does not represent a
determination on the Sudanese legal system as such, but is essentially a result of
the absence of criminal proceedings relating to the cases on which the OTP is
likely to focus." 6'
Based on an analysis of complementarity seemingly focused on ability, will-
ingness, and status of the offender, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo concluded that
some cases would be admissible in the ICC.62 At the very least, the OTP views
the Sudan as unable or unwilling genuinely to prosecute the most egregious of-
fenders in the Darfur conflict-offenders who most likely are high-ranking gov-
ernment officials. The OTP's determination should be of concern to the United
States because it illustrates the ICC's ability to assert jurisdiction in a situation in
which outside involvement is unwanted and actively opposed.
IL Implications for Future Investigations: Does the United States Have
Cause for Alarm?
The United States is not a State Party to the Rome Statute.63 Although the
United States participated in drafting the Rome Statute, it has not become a State
Party due to its concerns that the ICC's jurisdiction extends to nationals of non-
parties and encompasses senior government officials.64 The United States en-
acted the American Servicemembers' Protection Act ("ASPA") to address and
help remedy its concern that U.S. citizens could involuntarily be subject to ICC
jurisdiction.65 ASPA requires countries desiring U.S. aid or military assistance to
60 See ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 21, at 56; SECOND REPORT, supra note 35, at 6. Impor-
tantly, this report also notes that since establishing the Special National Criminal Court on Darfur as "a
substitute to the International Criminal Court" the government has extended increased immunity protec-
tions to soldiers and continues to avoid prosecution of offenses amounting to war crimes. ENTRENCHING
IMPUNITY, supra note 21, at 57.
61 FIRST REPORT, supra note 14, at 4.
62 Id.
63 Press Statement, U.S. Dep't of State, International Criminal Court: Letter to UN Secretary Gen-
eral Kofi Annan (May 6, 2002), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm.
64 President's Statement on the Rome Treaty on the International Criminal Court, supra note 1, at 6.
President Clinton signed the Rome Statute but stated that he would not send it to the Senate until con-
cerns over the ICC's jurisdiction were addressed. Id. The Bush administration subsequently revoked the
United States' signature. Press Statement, U.S. Dep't of State, International Criminal Court: Letter to
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (May 6, 2002), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm.
65 American Servicemembers' Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7433 (2006). In setting forth its
reasons for enacting the ASPA, Congress stated that:
In addition to exposing members of the Armed Forces of the United States to the risk of interna-
tional criminal prosecution, the Rome Statute creates a risk that the President and other senior
elected and appointed officials of the United States Government may be prosecuted by the Inter-
national Criminal Court .... No less than members of the Armed Forces of the United States,
senior officials of the United States Government should be free from the risk of prosecution by
the International Criminal Court, especially with respect to official actions taken by them to
protect the national interests of the United States.
See id. § 7421(9) (2006); see also Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 98. Article 98 prohibits the ICC from
proceeding with a request for surrender of individuals to ICC custody if the request would require a state
to act in a manner inconsistent with an international agreement requiring the sending state's consent. Id.
Such agreements are commonly called Article 98 or Bilateral Immunity Agreements ("BIAs").
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sign waivers of ICC jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Rome Statute unless they
fall within a narrow class of specified exemptions. 66
The United States has executed over one hundred Article 98 agreements, also
called Bilateral Immunity Agreements ("BIAs"). 67 Thus, because ICC jurisdic-
tion applies only if the state of territoriality or nationality is a State Party to the
Rome Statute, 68 the UN Security Council refers a situation to the ICC, 6 9 or the
prosecutor initiates an investigation, 70 and because all investigations are subject
to an order of deferral by the Security Council, 7' significant protections are avail-
able to U.S. citizens abroad.
There are three main reasons for these protections. First, BIA's require most,
if not all, territorial states to which the United States sends diplomatic and mili-
tary personnel to refuse ICC requests for surrender of U.S. citizens. 72 Second,
the United States, as the state of nationality, would not voluntarily submit to the
Court's jurisdiction. 73 Third, the United States, as a permanent member of the
Security Council, could veto any proposed resolution to grant the ICC jurisdic-
tion over its nationals and could urge the Security Council to defer any investiga-
tion the prosecutor commences independently.74  Therefore, BIAs, in
combination with the U.S. role as a permanent member of the Security Council,
provide significant protection against ICC jurisdiction.
A. Potential Avenues for ICC Jurisdiction over U.S. Nationals
There are, however, three situations in which U.S. citizens could potentially
come within the ICC's jurisdiction. First, a State Party that has not executed a
BIA with the United States could refer crimes committed on its territory to the
ICC.75 However, this is unlikely considering that Congress has severely re-
stricted the deployment of U.S. military and peacekeeping forces to countries
without BIAs. 76 Second, a non-State Party without a BIA and on whose territory
a crime has been committed could accept the Court's jurisdiction by submitting a
66 22 U.S.C. § 7426 (2006). Countries exempted from BIA requirements are: NATO allies; major
non-NATO allies, specifically including Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Argentina, the Republic
of Korea, and New Zealand, and Taiwan. See id. § 7426(d). The president may also make an exception
for a country otherwise not exempt when he finds it in the national interest to do so. See id. § 7426(b).
67 The American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Court,
Bilateral Immunity Agreements, http://www.amicc.org/usinfo/administration-policy-BIAs.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 27, 2006) (figure last updated May 2, 2005) [hereinafter AMICC].
68 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 12.
69 Id. art. 13(b).
70 Id. art. 13(c).
71 Id. art. 16 (stating that R. 1.5(a)(i) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council may
issue a resolution ordering the ICC to defer prosecution for a period of one year and may renew the
resolution indefinitely).
72 AMICC, supra note 64, at 1.
73 See id. at 2.
74 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 16.
75 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 12(2).
76 See 22 U.S.C. § 7426 (2006).
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declaration to the Court's Registrar. 77 Iraq is such a country.78 Third, a State
Party that has executed a BIA and on whose territory a crime may have been
committed, such as Afghanistan, 79 could suspend or terminate the agreement on
grounds of invalidity, asserting that it violates the object and purpose of the
Rome Statute.80 Yet, even if one of these somewhat remote possibilities were to
come to fruition, and presuming that the United States claimed its jurisdiction as
the state of nationality, the ICC could not assert jurisdiction over U.S. nationals
unless it found the United States unable or unwilling genuinely to investigate or
prosecute under the Rome Statute.81 With this framework in mind-particularly
Iraq's ability to submit to ICC jurisdiction-the next section provides a factual
account of the Department of Defense interrogation policies employed at the Abu
Ghraib prison as a basis for examining whether complementarity would be a bar
to ICC jurisdiction over U.S. officials for the abuses committed in Iraq.
B. Authorized Interrogation Procedures and Detainee Abuse at the Abu
Ghraib Prison in Iraq
Where the documentation of atrocities in the Sudan is obtained from non-state
actors and organizations, much of the information on the interrogation policies of
the United States and how those policies evolved into practice is available from
the U.S. government itself. Because statements made by government officials
are highly probative evidence in international courts, 82 the information concern-
ing U.S. interrogation policy and detainee treatment may be particularly signifi-
77 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 12(3).
78 Iraq is not a party to the Rome Statute and has not executed a BIA with the United States. Interna-
tional Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/statesparties.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 29, 2006); AMICC, supra note 67.
79 Afghanistan acceded to the Rome Statute on February 10, 2003. International Criminal Court,
Assembly of State Parties: Afghanistan, http://www.icccpi.int/asp/statesparties/coutry&id=41. html (last
visited Oct. 13, 2006). It executed a BIA with the United States on September 20, 2002. AMICC, supra
note 67.
80 See James Crawford, Philippe Sands & Ralph Wilde, In the Matter of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court and in the Matter of Bilateral Agreements Sought by the United States Under
Article 98(2) of the Statute 24 (2003), http://www.anicc.org/docs/Art98_14uneO3FINAL.pdf (last visited
Oct. 29, 2006) (reasoning that an important object and purpose of the Rome Statute is to avoid impunity,
so to the extent that the United States would not investigate or prosecute individuals protected by BIAs,
upholding such agreements may cause State Parties to violate the object and purpose of the Statute). See
generally Eric M. Meyer, International Law: The Compatibility of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court with the U.S. Bilateral Immunity Agreements Included in the American Servicemembers'
Protection Act, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 97, 116-30 (2005) (discussing concerns with the broad scope of BIAs
and their lack of language providing that U.S. nationals would be investigated and potentially prosecuted
by the U.S. government).
81 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(l)(a).
82 Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Around Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 41
(June 27). In this opinion, the International Court of Justice reasoned that:
The material before the Court also includes statements by representatives of States, sometimes at
the highest political level .... [S]tatements of this kind, emanating from high-ranking official
political figures, sometimes indeed of the highest rank, are of particular probative value when
they acknowledge facts or conduct unfavourable [sic] to the State represented by the person who
made them. They may then be construed as a form of admission.
Id.
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cant to a potential complementarity assessment. This section reviews
documentation of the U.S. government's policies and procedures pertaining to
interrogation and torture to illustrate the lack of clear guidelines and boundaries
for servicemembers in Iraq. It argues that this lack of clear policy guidelines
ultimately led to a situation ripe for abuse at Abu Ghraib. 83 The next section
explores the possibility that the ICC could make a finding of unwillingness or
inability on the part of the United States in the context of detainee abuse at Abu
Ghraib.
1. Authorization of Alternative Interrogation Techniques at Guantanamo Bay
In early 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed that, pursuant
to a presidential determination, members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban were not
entitled to prisoner-of-war ("POW") status under the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions.84 Thus, when captured, such individuals were to be treated "humanely"
and "to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner
consistent" with the Geneva Conventions, 85 rather than explicitly in accordance
with them.
On December 2, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld authorized several new procedures
for interrogation at the request of Major General Michael Dunlavey, Commander
of the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who voiced concern that the
existing tactics provided in the Army Field Manual were yielding insufficient
intelligence. 86 These new procedures included: using stress positions such as
standing in uncomfortable positions for up to four hours; solitary confinement for
up to thirty days; deprivation of light and sound; twenty-four hour interrogations;
removal of clothing; using detainees' individual phobias to induce stress; and
"mild non-injurious physical contact, such as grabbing, poking in the chest with
the finger, and light pushing. ' 87 These new techniques, although surpassing the
conduct allowed under the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field Manual,
were consistent with the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel's
("OLC") narrow definition of torture as "intense pain or suffering of the kind that
83 For a comprehensive account of the development of U.S. policy regarding the status and treatment
of detainees, see Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 820
(2004).
84 Memorandum from Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff 1 (Jan. 19, 2002), http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.19.pdf [hereinafter
Rumsfeld Memorandum]; Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Richard B.
Cheney, Vice President, Colin Powell, Sec'y of State, Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., John Ashcroft,
Attorney Gen., and Other Officials 1 (Feb. 7, 2002), http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB
127/020207.pdf.
85 Rumsfeld Memorandum, supra note 84.
86 Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, Dep't of Def. Gen. Counsel, to Donald H. Rumsfeld,
Sec'y of Def. 1 (Nov. 27, 2002), http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.12.02.pdf
[hereinafter Haynes Memorandum] (bearing Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's signature in approval on
December 2, 2002); Memorandum from Michael Dunlavey, Major Gen., to Commander of U.S. S. Com-
mand 1 (Oct. 11, 2002), http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 127/02.10.1 I.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Dunlavey Memorandum].
87 Haynes Memorandum, supra note 86, at 1.
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is equivalent to the pain that would be associated with serious physical injury so
severe that death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in a loss of sig-
nificant body function will likely result. '88
Secretary Rumsfeld later repealed this authorization due to concerns raised
over its legality8 9 and approved twenty-four additional interrogation techniques
for use at Guantanamo Bay three months later.90 The vast majority of the new
techniques did not set forth specific acts, but consisted of vague terms such as
"Emotional Love: Playing on the love a detainee has for a particular individual
or group" and "Fear Up Harsh: Significantly increasing the fear level in a de-
tainee." 9 1 The use of vague terms rather than specific descriptions of permissible
conduct fostered wide latitude in interpretation, leaving individual interrogators
to question what techniques were authorized and allowing them to determine
such guidelines themselves.
2. Migration of Alternative Interrogation Techniques to the Abu Ghraib
Prison in Iraq
Though the techniques were approved only for Guantanamo Bay, Major Gen-
eral Geoffrey Miller later brought them to Iraq and recommended them as a po-
88 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzalez, White House
Counsel, Regarding Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, 13 (Aug. 1,
2002), http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.08.01.pdf [hereinafter Bybee
Memorandum].
89 Memorandum from Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., to Commander of U.S. S. Command I
(Jan. 15, 2003), http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/03.01.15.pdf; Murphy, supra
note 83, at 826.
90 Memorandum from Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., to Commander of U.S. S. Command,
Regarding Counter-resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism, Tab A, 1-3 (Apr. 16, 2003), http://
www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 127/03.04.16.pdf [hereinafter Southern Command Letter];
Pentagon Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assess-
ment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations 6-8 (Apr. 4, 2003), http://www.truth
.org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/4/481 1. The Working Group's analysis argues in essence that the only
protections against torture are found in the Constitution and that, because the Constitution does not apply
extra-territorially to non-citizens, foreigners interrogated abroad (including at Guantanamo Bay) have no
right to be free from torture. Id. This analysis turns a blind eye to international law and U.S. treaty
obligations under the Convention Against Torture And Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 24 I.L.M. 535. Treaty claims aside, the prohibition against torture is estab-
lished as a norm of customary international law. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
Torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment can also constitute war crimes and crimes against
humanity. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 7-8.
91 Southern Command Letter, supra note 90, Tab A, at 1-3. Some techniques included equally
vague disclaimers, such as:
Pride and Ego Down: Attacking or insulting the ego of a detainee, not beyond the limits that
would apply to a POW. [Caution: Article 17 of provides, "Prisoners of war who refuse to
answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treat-
ment of any kind." Other nations that believe that detainees are entitled to POW protections may
consider this technique inconsistent with the provisions of Geneva. Although the provisions of
Geneva are not applicable to interrogations of unlawful combatants, consideration should be
given to these views prior to application of the technique.].
Id. Tab A, at 2. These instructions, however, provide no information as to what the limits that apply to
prisoners of war might be or what degree of consideration should be given to the views of countries that
apply the Geneva Conventions. Id. Tab A, at 1-3.
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tential model for procedures there. 92 Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the
highest-ranking officer in Iraq at that time, accordingly adopted the Guantanamo
Bay techniques for use at Abu Ghraib,93 although the Geneva Conventions
clearly applied in Iraq and most of the Iraqi detainees were criminals not sus-
pected of having ties to the Taliban or al Qaeda that would, in the view of the
Bush administration, remove them from protections afforded by the Geneva Con-
ventions. 94 The Guantanamo Bay techniques were not the only interrogation pro-
cedures used in Iraq. An investigatory government report states that military
authorities altered interrogation policies so frequently that by October 2003, the
policies had changed three times in less than thirty days.95
The migration of servicemembers and ever-changing interrogation policies
from Guantanamo Bay to Iraq, coupled with the sometimes difficult determina-
tion of civilian from enemy combatant, created an environment at Abu Ghraib in
which abuse could easily occur within a presumable grant of authority. It is
useful here to recall the OLC's definition of torture as pain akin to that associated
with "death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in a loss of significant
body function," and to note that the OLC further interpreted torture to be a spe-
cific intent crime.96 Accordingly, if an interrogator was motivated by a desire to
obtain information rather than an intent to cause severe pain, mistreatment could
not be classified as torture. 97 Because this interpretation of torture is highly con-
troversial, administration officials retreated from this stance shortly after the
OLC opinion became public in mid-2004. 98
The Rome Statute's definition of torture as a war crime encompasses a broader
scope of maltreatment than does the Bush administration's extremely narrow def-
inition.99 Thus, the type conduct authorized by the U.S. government could poten-
92 Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations 9-10 (Aug. 24,
2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/d20040824finalreport.pdf [hereinafter Schlesinger Re-
port]; Major General Antonio Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade 8
(Mar. 12, 2004), http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/Taguba%20Report.pdf [herein-
after Taguba Report].
93 Schlesinger Report, supra note 92, at 9-10.
94 Id.; Taguba Report, supra note 92, at 8.
95 Major General Fay, Investigating Officer, AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and
205th Military Intelligence Brigade 28 (Aug. 25, 2004), http://fll.findlaw.com/news.finlaw.com.hdocs/
docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf [hereinafter Fay Report].
96 Bybee Memorandum, supra note 88, at 3-4, 13.
97 Id.
98 Mike Allen & Susan Schmidt, Memo on Interrogation Tactics Is Disavowed, WASH. POST, June
27, 2004, at Al; Chronology of Abu Ghraib, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/world/iraq/
abughraib/timeline.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
99 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(2)(a)(ii). Torture under the Rome Statute is defined as: "the
intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody
or under the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only
from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanction." Id. art. 7(2)(e). Of note, torture under the Rome
Statute is not a specific intent crime, encompasses severe mental pain and suffering, does not require
physical pain or suffering to be of the degree associated with organ-failure, and applies to all persons in
the custody or under the control of the accused, without exception for persons such as U.S. designated
unlawful enemy combatants. The Rome Statute also punishes "inhuman treatment" as a war crime. Id.
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tially be considered within the ICC's jurisdiction. °° With the context of the
inquiry now established, this article considers the complementarity assessment
necessary if the OTP were to pursue charges against U.S. government and mili-
tary officials.
C. Application of the Office of the Prosecutor's Admissibility Assessment in
Darfur to U.S. Torture Allegations
Under the Rome Statute, a state may be deemed unable to genuinely investi-
gate or prosecute when it cannot obtain the accused, evidence, or testimony, or is
otherwise unable to carry out the proceedings due to a "total or substantial col-
lapse or unavailability of its national judicial system."'' ° A state may be consid-
ered unwilling to genuinely investigate or prosecute when its investigations
appear to have been undertaken in an attempt to shield the accused from criminal
responsibility, there is an unjustified delay in the proceedings which is deemed
inconsistent with the intent to bring the accused to justice, the proceedings are
not independent or impartial, or they are not being conducted consistent with an
intent to bring the accused to justice. 0 2 This section considers the United States'
ability and willingness to investigate allegations of detainee abuse at high levels
of command. The next section focuses on the status of the offender specifically
as a factor of the OTP admissibility assessment.
1. Ability: Structure of and Access to the National Judicial System
In the United States, high-level military and government officials are only in-
frequently investigated or prosecuted for official acts through civilian and mili-
tary courts. 103 Such individuals are instead investigated through more
specialized procedures such as internal military and government agency investi-
gations' 04 and congressional inquiries. 0 5 Thus, for purposes of an admissibility
assessment, this section briefly discusses the military court-martial process. It
then evaluates the procedures for reviewing the acts of senior military officers by
the Department of the Army Inspector General ("DAIG") and the effectiveness
100 Whether the OTP would construe the abuses at Abu Ghraib as war crimes is outside the scope of
this article. However, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo has stated that such a finding is unlikely given the
disparity in gravity of the offenses between the Abu Ghraib incidents and the conflicts in Darfur, North-
ern Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Iraq Response, 8-10
(Feb. 9, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP-letter-to-senders re lraq_9_February-
2006.pdf (last visited Dec. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Iraq Response]. Due to this conclusion, the prosecutor
found it unnecessary to reach a conclusion on complementarity. Id. at 9.
101 Id. art. 17(3).
102 Id. art. 17(2).
103 Lieutenant Colonel Victor M. Hansen, Walking on Unfamiliar Ground: A Primer For Defense
Counsel Representing Clients in an Inspector General Investigation, ARpm LAW., Mar. 2005, at 1, 4
(noting that it is Army policy to forward all allegations of impropriety or misconduct to the Department
of the Army Inspector General's Office).
104 Id.
105 See generally Michael J. Davidson, Congressional Investigations and Their Effect on Subsequent
Military Prosecutions, 14 J.L. & POL. 281 (2006).
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of internal military and executive agency investigations. It also discusses the
ability of the legislative branch to act as a check on executive and military ac-
tions. The following section explores the willingness of these entities to conduct
genuine investigations into the alleged abuse and to prosecute to the extent that
they are able to do so.
a. Court-martial Proceedings
The U.S. military chiefly prosecutes criminal conduct through its process of
court-martial proceedings, which are akin to civilian criminal trials.' 0 6 Courts-
martial are not held in permanent courts, but are established on an ad hoc basis
whenever a report of misconduct is made to the convening authority. 0 7 The rank
required of the convening authority depends on the type of offense alleged. 0 8 It
also depends on the rank of the accused because the convening authority must be
at a higher level of command in order to instigate the charges. 10 9 Trials are
conducted before a military judge, and the accused may elect to be tried by the
judge as opposed to a panel of his peers. 110 Once a verdict is rendered, the
convening authority has discretion to downgrade a finding of guilt or a sen-
tence."' Because the convening authority selects potential panel members for
voir dire, and may also be the commander of members of the panel, detailed
guidelines have been created to avoid improper command influence. 1 2
There is an automatic appeals process for all cases in which a verdict of death,
dismissal, or confinement for one year or more is imposed.' 13 Other appeals are
discretionary.1 "4 Cases are first appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals for
the appropriate division of the military, and then to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces. 15 Decisions made by the United States Court of
106 See Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"), 10 U.S.C. §§ 816-20 (2000).
107 Id. § 822. A convening authority is any authorized officer superior to an accused. Rule for
Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 601(b), Discussion.
108 General courts-martial are convened for the most serious offenses, and must be enacted by the
president of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, the commanding officer of an Army division,
brigade, or fleet, or any other commander authorized by the President or the Secretary of Defense.
UCMJ art. 22, 10 U.S.C. § 822 (2000). Special courts-martial are convened for other serious offenses
punishable by confinement of up to six months and may be ordered by a greater array of commanders.
UCMJ art. 23, 10 U.S.C. § 823 (2000). Summary courts-martial are convened for offenses punishable by
confinement of up to one month and may be ordered by an even greater array of commanders. UCMJ art.
24, 10 U.S.C. § 824 (2000). Officers cannot be tried in summary courts-martial. Id.
109 Id.
110 10 U.S.C. §§ 825-26.
111 R.C.M. I 107(d)(l)("The convening authority may for any or no reason disprove a legal sentence
in whole or in part, mitigate the sentence, and change a punishment to one of a different nature as long as
the severity of the punishment is not increased").
112 UCMJ art. 37, 10 U.S.C. § 837 (2000); Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M. 104).
"13 UCMJ arts. 66-67, 10 U.S.C. §§ 866-67(2000).
114 Id.
115 Id.
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Appeals for the Armed Forces may be reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court by grant of certiorari.116
b. Alternative Investigations
Unlike the convening authority in a court-martial, the DIAG is an investiga-
tory unit outside the chain of command.' " 7 The DAIG investigates senior offi-
cials, defined as general officers, brigadier general selects, and senior civilian
officers.' 18 Army policy requires that "any and all allegations of impropriety and
misconduct" by these classes of officials be referred to the DAIG for investiga-
tion.119 When an individual becomes the subject of a DIAG investigation, any
collateral criminal investigation must cease and the command is required to sub-
mit the collateral matter to DIAG.' 20
The most common sanction following a DAIG investigation is a General Of-
ficer Memorandum of Reprimand ("GOMOR").' 2' Issuance of a GOMOR likely
will have significant effects on an official's career, including an inability to be
promoted and the possibility of retirement at a lower rank. ' 22 A DAIG investiga-
tion may also serve as the basis for a referral to court-martial proceedings. 2 3
However, "[iln the case of senior officers, any adverse administrative actions will
usually be taken [by other means]."'1 24
Additionally, government and military officials may establish internal investi-
gations to review allegations of misconduct. The Secretary of Defense is em-
powered to create investigatory panels as a means of independent investigation
into military policy and procedure.' 2 5 Most recently, Secretary Rumsfeld com-
missioned an Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations.' 26 The
resulting report of this review is commonly referred to as the Schlesinger Report,
after the name of the chief investigating officer, former Secretary of Defense
James Schlesinger. 27 Senior military officials may also commission reports. 28
For instance, the Army internal report by Major General Antonio Taguba, dis-
cussed at length in the following section, was requested by Lieutenant General
116 UCMJ art. 67(a), 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(2000).
117 Hansen, supra note 103, at 4.
118 Id.
119 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
120 Id.
121 Id. at 16.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Schlesinger Report, supra note 91, at 21.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Taguba Report, supra note 92, at 6.
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Sanchez to investigate the activities of the 800th Military Police Brigade at Abu
Ghraib. 129
c. Congressional Investigation
Apart from the military's internal review, Congress may also serve as a check
on the conduct of senior military and administration officials through its report-
ing and oversight functions.1 30 Although congressional investigations do not di-
rectly result in criminal investigations or punishment, Congress' power to
investigate executive conduct can "precipitate removal or resignation through the
discomfort of oversight and investigation."' 31 Congress may also sanction exec-
utive conduct through rare exercises of its impeachment power or pass resolu-
tions that urge the president to remove an individual.1 32
Thus, while the Sudanese courts have been severely handicapped, U.S. chan-
nels of investigation remain independent from outside influence and have not
suffered structural changes that impede their effectiveness. The court-martial
process in the military judicial system is fully functional. Also, the DAIG re-
mains an unencumbered resource for investigation into conduct by military offi-
cials and internal investigation procedures have been utilized. Lastly, Congress
is able to monitor the conduct of civilian officials through its oversight power.
Because the applicable national judicial system and administrative procedures
remains available, and because Congress is also unencumbered in its ability to
review the actions of senior officials, it is unlikely that the OTP would have a
basis on which to conclude that the United States is unable genuinely to investi-
gate or prosecute allegations of detainee abuse for purposes of complementar-
ity. 13 3 The complementarity test, however, is disjunctive, requiring a finding of
either inability or unwillingness.' 34 Therefore, the next section discusses the
willingness of the United States to investigate and prosecute detainee abuse re-
gardless of the finding that its ability to do so is not compromised.
2. Willingness: Independent and Impartial Investigation or National
Prosecution with Regard to Particular Crimes or Suspects
This section discusses the United States' willingness genuinely to investigate
and prosecute wrongdoing at upper levels of authority. First, this section dis-
129 Id. Lieutenant General Sanchez requested the investigation under Army Regulation 381-10, Pro-
cedure 15-6, which governs maters relating to intelligence. See Paul M. Peterson, Civilian Demonstra-
tions Near the Military Installation: Restraints on Military Surveillance and Other Intelligence Activities,
140 Mn.. L. REV. 113, 122-23 (1993).
130 U.S. CONST. art. I §§ 1, 8. Though an investigatory function is not textually explicit, it is largely
recognized as a necessary component of Congress' lawmaking powers. See generally Sam Nunn, The
Impact of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on Federal Policy, 21 GA. L. REV. 17,
18-19 (1986).
131 L. Anthony Sutin, Check Please: Constitutional Dimensions of Halting the Pay of Public Offi-
cials, 26 J. LEGIS. 221, 223 (2000).
132 Id.
133 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(3).
134 Id. art. 17.
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cusses national investigations, which consist of internal military and agency in-
quiries conducted by current and former officials. Next, this section explores the
paucity of national prosecutions, looking to arguments made in courts-martial of
enlisted servicemembers to support the conclusion that, although investigation of
officials is warranted, the United States has not demonstrated a willingness genu-
inely to investigate or prosecute.
a. National Investigations
To date, ten internal investigations have been conducted by various executive
branch and military departments, yet only one investigator, former Secretary of
Defense James Schlesinger, was authorized to examine the chain of command
extending to Secretary Rumsfeld.135 The remaining investigations were mostly
led by officials in current command charged with investigating their subordinates
through informal procedures and lacking authority to critique their superiors. 136
None are truly independent and, although a few GOMORs have been issued fol-
lowing informal investigations, it is unclear whether the DAIG has initiated any
investigations of military officials. 137 Although several reports have indicated
that Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") officers committed acts of severe de-
tainee abuse, 138 there has been no independent investigation into such activity.139
Conversely, efforts have been made to remove implications of CIA involvement
from official records.' 40 Further, the Department of Justice has denied requests
to appoint an independent prosecutor to investigate allegations of detainee
135 KENNETH ROTH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR AND ABU GHRAIB 8, http://www.hrw.org/
wr2k5/darfurandabughraib/darfurandabughraib.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
136 Id.; Army Regulation 15-6: Procedure for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers 1, availa-
ble at http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r15-6.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
137 ROTH, supra note 135, at 8.
138 See, e.g., Fay Report, supra note 95, at 9 (concluding that "[Tihe CIA's detention and interroga-
tion practices contributed to a loss of accountability and abuse at Abu Ghraib."); Homicide Unpunished,
WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2006, at A14; HUMAN RjGHTS WATCH, LEADERSHIP FAILURE: FIRSTHAND Ac-
COUNTS OF TORTURE OF IRAQI DETAINEES BY THE U.S. ARMY'S 82ND AIRBORNE DivISION 7 (Sept. 2005);
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2006 at 506 (2006).
139 A Future Investigation, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2005, at B06. The CIA Inspector General is report-
edly investigating allegations of CIA involvement in the torture and illegal detention of detainees, but
because there is no outside oversight of the investigation and its results (unless leaked) will not be
released to the public, it is impossible to evaluate the adequacy of any such investigation. R. Jeffrey
Smith & Dafna Lizner, CIA Officer's Job Made Any Leaks More Delicate, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2006, at
A01.
140 Josh White, Documents Tell of Brutal Improvisation by GIs, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2005, at A01
(noting the difficulty in determining the full circumstances of the death of a suffocated detainee because
"the circumstances are listed as 'classified' on his official autopsy [and] court records have been censored
to hide the CIA's involvement in his questioning").
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abuse,' 4 ' and the investigation by the Senate Armed Services Committee has
made no ascertainable progress in the past year.14 2
Two investigative reports in particular-those authored by Major General
Taguba and former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger-illustrate the lack of will-
ingness to investigate higher ranks of command. On March 12, 2004, Major
General Taguba released the confidential findings of his Department of Defense
investigation into the abuse at Abu Ghraib. 143 Taguba's investigation was re-
quested by Lieutenant General Sanchez, the highest ranking officer at Abu
Ghraib at that time.' 44 Lieutenant General Sanchez specifically asked that
Taguba investigate the 800th Military Police Brigade, the unit responsible for the
acts depicted in the now infamous Abu Ghraib photographs. 45
The abuse that Major General Taguba documented included: jumping on de-
tainees' naked feet; forcing nudity for extended periods of time; videotaping and
photographing naked detainees; using dogs without muzzles to intimidate detain-
ees; positioning a naked detainee on a box "with a sandbag on his head, and
attaching wires to his fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture"; pour-
ing phosphoric liquid from chemical lights on detainees; pouring cold water on
naked detainees; threatening detainees with rape; and actual instances of sexual
abuse or rape. 146 Major General Taguba also found that despite such horrific
abuse, there was no evidence that Brigadier General Karpinski, commander of
the brigade, or Colonel Thomas Pappas, the commanding officer at Abu Ghraib,
took steps to stop the abuse. 147 He therefore recommended that they be issued
GOMORs. 48 Despite Taguba's conclusion that "numerous incidents of sadistic,
blatant, and wanton criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees," he also
concluded that "[t]his systemic and illegal abuse of detainees was intentionally
perpetrated by several members of the military police guard force" and was not
indicative of a higher-level breach of procedure.' 49
This conclusion is alarming, especially because no action was recommended
against the most immediate officials implicated in the scandal-Major General
Miller, who brought the controversial Guantanamo interrogation methods to Iraq,
and Lieutenant General Sanchez, who authorized the use of the Guantanamo
methods at Abu Ghraib-notwithstanding Taguba's own finding that most of the
141 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GETTING AWAY WITH TORTURE?: COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR
THE U.S. ABUSE OF DETAINEES 82 (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/us0405/us
0405.pdf; A Future Investigation, supra note 139.
142 Hearing Schedule: Investigation Into FBI Allegations of Detainee Abuse at the Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba Detention Facility Before Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, 109th Cong. (2005), availa-
ble at http://armed-services.senate.gov/e-witnesslist.cfm?id=1574 (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
143 Taguba Report, supra note 92.
144 Id. at 6.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 16-18.
147 Id. at 20, 44-45.
148 Id. at 44-45.
149 Id. at 16.
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detainees at Abu Ghraib were civilian criminals rather than enemy combatants.150
As civilians held in combat, the Geneva conventions clearly applied to the treat-
ment of most, if not all, detainees at Abu Ghraib and the application of Geneva
protections for such persons was not contested by President Bush.' 51 The report
specifically recognized that Miller's recommendation that military guards should
set "the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees" was in conflict
with army manual guidelines prohibiting military police officers from participat-
ing in intelligence interrogations. 152
One reason for Taguba's failure to recommend action against Miller could be
that they were both two-star generals at the time of the investigation. Although
generals of the same rank can investigate each other, according to Deputy De-
partment of Defense spokesman Bryan Whitman, "it isn't practical." 153 Taguba
could not investigate Sanchez because Sanchez was a three-star general. 154
Sanchez, who also requested an investigation into whether interrogators in-
structed the military police to rough up detainees in preparation for interrogation,
later removed himself from that investigation so a higher-ranked general could
oversee it and instruct the new investigator, who was also to be higher in rank, to
question Sanchez. 155 That investigation culminated in the Fay-Jones Report,
which adopted General Taguba's findings.' 5 6 Although it concluded that
Sanchez "failed to ensure proper staff oversight of detention and interrogation
operations," it did not recommend that Sanchez be reprimanded. 157 The Fay-
Jones Report's conclusion that Miller "did not introduce 'harsh techniques' into
the Abu Ghraib detention operation," appears to contradict its earlier recognition
that Miller "introduced written GTMO documentation" as procedures recom-
mended for use at Abu Ghraib. 158 The report did not recommend any further
investigation of Miller's conduct. 159
Former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's report of his investigation into De-
partment of Defense general detention operations is slightly more balanced than
150 Id. at 8.
151 Geneva Convention (Third) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, arts. 3, 130; Geneva Convention (Fourth) Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, arts. 3, 147; Rumsfeld
Memorandum, supra note 84.
152 Id. at 8-9.
153 Leon Worden, Abuse Inquiry Heading Higher, SIGNAL CITY, June 11, 2004, available at http://
www.scvhistory.com/scvhistory/signal/iraq/sg061104c.htm.
154 Michael Hirsh & John Berry, The Abu Ghraib Scandal Cover Up?, NEWSWEEK, June 7, 2004.
155 Leon Worden, Army Adds Stars to Intelligence Inquiry, SIGNAL CITY, June 18, 2004, available at
http://www.scvhistory.com/scvhistory/signal/iraq/sg06I804.htm. Lieutenant General Anthony Jones, a
three-star general technically senior to Sanchez because he has held the rank longer, was appointed to
oversee the investigation and continue to work with General Fay. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MILITARY
INVESTIGATIONS INTO TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY, July 16, 2004, available at http://
www.hrw.org/campaigns/torture/071604investigations.pdf.
156 See generally Fay Report, supra note 95.
157 Id. at 30.
158 Id. at 24-25, 58, 117.
159 Id. at 117.
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Taguba's, and Schlesinger, as a former Secretary of Defense, had greater author-
ity to conduct his investigation. However, the investigation still raises questions
of independence and impartiality. Schlesinger's report tracks the migration of
interrogators and techniques authorized for Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and
Iraq, 160 noting in particular Major General Miller's contribution of Guantanamo
Bay interrogation guidelines. 16 1 The report further records that in the month fol-
lowing Miller's visit, Lieutenant General Sanchez approved a policy on interro-
gation containing a dozen techniques borrowed from Guantanamo and five
beyond those approved for Guantanamo. 162 Lieutenant General Sanchez cited
President Bush's determination that "unlawful combatants" are outside all appli-
cable Geneva Convention protections as a basis for his belief that use of mea-
sures not authorized in the Army Field Manual was permissible. 163 Sanchez
reportedly justified this deviation with his belief that "tougher measures were
warranted because there were unlawful combatants 'mixed in' with Enemy Pris-
oners of War and civilian and criminal detainees." 164 To the contrary, an internal
Army report found that "the overwhelming evidence. . . shows that all 'detain-
ees' at Abu Ghraib were civilian internees."' 65
Though Schlesinger did not find a "policy of abuse" orchestrated by govern-
ment officials, his report concluded that "the abuses were not just a failure of
some individuals to follow known standards, and they are more than the failure
of a few leaders to enforce proper discipline. There is both institutional and
personal responsibility at higher levels." 166 Schlesinger found that the most seri-
ous instances of abuse at Abu Ghraib were caused by the "aberrant behavior" of a
few soldiers. Yet he also noted that:
[c]ommanding officers and their staffs at various levels failed in their
duties and ... such failures contributed directly or indirectly to detainee
abuse. Commanders are responsible for all their units do or fail to do,
and should be held accountable for their action or inaction .... Military
and civilian leaders at the Department of Defense share this
responsibility. 167
Specifically, Schlesinger criticized Secretary Rumsfeld for not utilizing "a
wider range of legal opinions and more robust debate regarding detainee policies
160 See Schlesinger Report, supra note 92, at 9-10.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 9.
163 Id. at 10. Specifically, the Schlesinger Report cites a presidential memorandum accepting the
Department of Justice's conclusion that Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants. Id.
164 Id.
165 Fay Report, supra note 95, at 12. Civilian internees are defined as "someone who is interned
during armed conflict or occupation for security reasons or protection or because he has committed an
offense against the detaining power." Id.
166 Schlesinger Report, supra note 92, at 5.
167 Id. at 43. Major General George R. Fay's report reaches the same conclusion, stating that:
"[llooking beyond personal responsibility, leader responsibility and command responsibility, systemic
problems and issues also contributed to the volatile environment in which the abuse occurred" including
lack of a clear interrogation policy for Iraq. Fay Report, supra note 95, at 8.
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and operations" while forming his policies, ostensibly referring to Rumsfeld's
lack of consultation with other agencies before relying on the OLC memoran-
dum's definition of torture as a basis for authorizing new interrogation proce-
dures.' 68 In fact, many have criticized Secretary Rumsfeld and his advisors for
consulting only with those administration attorneys and military officials already
known to share their beliefs.' 69 Yet when asked if Rumsfeld should resign,
Schlesinger commented that the loss of Secretary Rumsfeld would be a "boon for
all of America's enemies."' 70
Despite strong evidence of failures to provide clear guidelines and prevent
abuse, the Army has decided not to charge any military officials in Iraq.' 71 Of
those directly in the chain of command, only Brigadier General Karpinski and
Colonel Pappas were reprimanded, 172 and Brigadier General Karpinski was later
demoted to Colonel.' 73 Rather than reprimand him or express disapproval, Sec-
retary Rumsfeld made clear his intention to promote General Sanchez to a four-
star general.' 74 President Bush repeatedly praised Secretary Rumsfeld, 175 and
twice rejected Rumsfeld's offer to resign during the height of the Abu Ghraib
scandal. ' 76
The lack of independence and impartiality in the existing investigations-find-
ings strikingly similar to the criticisms of the Sudanese government's investiga-
tion-points in favor of an ICC determination of admissibility. In particular, the
lack of focus on determining the culpability of military and administration offi-
cials would likely be of concern to the OTP. Thus, there is a tenable argument
that the United States could be deemed unwilling genuinely to investigate allega-
tions of misconduct at the higher levels of command.
168 Schlesinger Report, supra note 92, at 8.
169 Jane Mayer, The Memo: How an Internal Effort to Ban the Abuse and Torture of Detainees was
Thwarted, NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 36.
170 Eric Schmitt, Iraq Abuse Trial Is Again Limited to Lower Ranks, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 23, 2006, at
Al.
171 Josh White, Senior Army Officers Cleared in Abuse Cases, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2005.
172 Taguba Report, supra note 92, at 44; R. Jeffrey Smith, Abu Ghraib Officer Gets Reprimand: Non-
Court-Martial Punishment for Dereliction of Duty Includes Fine, WASH. POST, May 12, 2005, at A16.
173 CNN, Bush Demotes Officer In Charge of Abu Ghraib, May 5, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/
US/05/05/abu.ghraib/index.html.
174 Chris Shumway, Pentagon Rewards Generals, Corporations Tied to Abu Ghraib Scandal, NEW
STANDARD, Oct. 17, 2004, http://newstandardnews.net/content/index.cfmitems/I 125.
175 CBS News, Bush Heaps Praise on Rumsfeld, May 10, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2004/05/10/iraq/main6l6681.shtml. At one news conference, President Bush told Rumsfeld: "You are
courageously leading our nation in the war on terrorism. You are doing a superb job." Id. More re-
cently, President Bush responded to criticisms of Rumsfeld's plans for a post-war Iraq, stating that "I'm
the decider and I decide what's best. And what's best is for Don Rumsfeld to remain as the secretary of
defense." Liz Sidoti, Rumsfeld Critics Must Grin and Bear It, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 27, 2006, availa-
ble at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/cotent/article/2006/04/27/AR200604 2 70 0 181. html.
176 CNN, Rumsfeld Twice Offered to Resign During Abu Ghraib Scandal, Feb. 5, 2005, http://www
.cnn.com/2005/ALLPOLITICS/02/03/rumsfeld.resign/index.html.
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b. National Prosecutions
The relative lack of national prosecutions also raises concerns over the will-
ingness of the United States to bring any resolution to the serious allegations of
detainee abuse. A small number of lower-ranking soldiers and reservists have
been tried in courts-martial proceedings. 177 Many of these soldiers have asserted
a defense of obedience to orders, a doctrine by which an accused is excused from
unlawful conduct if undertaken pursuant to orders that an ordinary person would
not have known to be unlawful.1 78 Charles Graner and Lynndie England, reserv-
ists in the 800th Military Police Brigade-the unit responsible for the now infa-
mous pictures of abuse at Abu Ghraib-both argued that they were following
orders when they engaged in acts of detainee abuse, as did the most recently
convicted servicemen, Chief Warrant Officer Lewis Welshofer 179 and dog han-
dler Sergeant Michael Smith.1 80
At trial, defense teams for both Graner and England sought to subpoena Secre-
tary Rumsfeld and Lieutenant General Sanchez to support their defenses that
harsh treatment of detainees was authorized and that they thought they were act-
ing within the set guidelines. 181 Yet these requests were denied on grounds that
any actions by Rumsfeld or Sanchez had no direct bearing on Graner and En-
gland's conduct. 182
At Welshofer's preliminary hearing, Colonel David Teeples, who had com-
manded Welshofer's unit, testified that the "claustrophobic technique" Welshofer
used to suffocate a detainee was both "approved and effective." 183 Colonel
Teeples has not been investigated for his connection to the detainee's death.
Major General Miller was subpoenaed to testify at Sergeant Smith's trial to
bolster the defense that Smith was obeying orders to use his dog to frighten
detainees-orders that originated with Miller.1 84 Choosing not to testify, Miller
invoked his right to remain silent under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Mili-
177 John Sifton, The United States Military and Central Intelligence Agency Personnel Abroad: Plug-
ging the Prosecutorial Gaps, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 487, 489-90 (2006) (noting that although the mili-
tary claims to have investigated over 600 claims of detainee abuse, Human Rights Watch has uncovered
evidence of only approximately 210 investigations. Human Rights Watch also reports that sixty-three
cases proceeded to courts-martial, and in only ten of those cases was a sentence of more than one year
imposed).
178 R.C.M. 916(d).
179 CNN, No Jail Time for Soldier in Death of Iraqi, Jan. 24, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006lLAW/
01/23/suffocation.case.ap/index.html; USA TODAY, Officer to Serve No Jail Time For Iraqi General's
Death, Jan. 24, 2006, http://www.usatoday.comL/news/nation/2006-01-23-iraqi-death-x.htm?csp=34;
Homicide Unpunished, supra note 138. Welshofer, who was convicted of negligent homicide for wrap-
ping a detainee with broken ribs in a sleeping bag, tying the bag with electrical cord, and sitting on the
detainee's chest until he asphyxiated, received a sentence of house arrest for sixty days with limited
leave. Id. at A14.
180 Schmitt, supra note 170, at Al. Smith was convicted of abusing detainees with his belgian shep-
herd. He was sentenced to six months confinement. Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 White, supra note 140, at A01.
184 Arnaud de Borchgrave, Torture Blame Game, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2006, at AOl.
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tary Justice ("UCMJ"), the military equivalent of the Fifth Amendment protec-
tion against self-incrimination.185 In a bizarre twist on the usual process, Colonel
Thomas Pappas, the commanding officer at Abu Ghraib whom General Taguba
recommended reprimanding with a GOMOR, was granted immunity for testify-
ing that he authorized the use of dogs to intimidate prisoners. 86 Why Pappas
was immunized to testify against a subordinate, rather than immunizing the
subordinate to try Pappas-and then possibly Miller, who Pappas also says au-
thorized the use of dogs187-is unclear. A convening authority later decided not
to pursue a court-martial against Colonel Pappas, choosing instead to follow
General Taguba's recommendation of issuing a GOMOR for two counts of dere-
liction of duty in failing to prevent abuse at Abu Ghraib. 188 Under the terms of
the reprimand, Pappas will forfeit half his pay for two months and will not be
considered for future promotions. 189 He retains his rank of colonel and is cur-
rently the commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade in Wiesbaden,
Germany. 190
The lack of independent and impartial national inquiry into responsibility at
higher levels of authority discussed in terms of national investigations and illus-
trated in this subsection indicates a refusal to deal with the allegations objectively
and impartially.' 91 Thus, the OTP could conclude that the United States has not
demonstrated a sufficient willingness to investigate or prosecute allegations of
detainee abuse due to an absence of impartial and independent investigations and
prosecutions at high levels of command, including top administration officials.
3. Status of the Alleged Offender
In accordance with its mandate to prevent impunity, the OTP aims to prose-
cute those bearing the greatest amount of responsibility for crimes within its ju-
risdiction. 92 If the OTP were to take the administration and military internal
documents as evidence that the abuse at Abu Ghraib was committed pursuant to a
policy originating within the upper levels of the Bush administration, it would
examine the ability and willingness of the United States to investigate or prose-
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Smith, supra note 172.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Recent legislation demonstrates the United States' unwillingness to investigate issues of detainee
abuse. The Military Commission Act of 2006, passed on October 17, 2006, declares that the Geneva
Conventions may not be invoked as a cause of action in a U.S. court against the United States or an
individual acting in an official capacity. Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 5(a), 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17, 2006)
[hereinafter MCA]. The MCA also applies the Detainee Treatment Act's mistake of law defense retroac-
tively to September 11, 2001. Id. § 8(b). Under the Detainee Treatment Act, it is a defense to allegations
of torture or cruel treatment that a U.S. person involved in detainee detention and interrogation did not
know that authorized interrogation practices were unlawful. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 10 U.S.C.
§ 1004.
192 Id.
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cute the particular officials it thought to be most responsible for detainee
abuse. ' 93
Given the paucity of independent U.S. investigations at this level, it is likely
that the OTP would have a strong basis on which to conclude that no national
investigation precludes ICC jurisdiction under the principle of complementarity.
For instance, although many of the government reports and allegations discussed
in the previous section implicate Major General Miller and Lieutenant General
Sanchez, the United States has not commenced any serious investigation into
their suspected roles fostering or allowing detainee abuse. Aside from the
Schlesinger Report, there has been no investigation of Secretary Rumsfeld's cul-
pability, though he knowingly authorized interrogation techniques that may con-
stitute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and war crimes under the
Rome Statute.' 94 Because Schlesinger was appointed to investigate the Depart-
ment of Defense's conduct by Rumsfeld himself, the OTP could conclude that
his report lacks sufficient independence and impartiality to constitute a bar to
ICC jurisdiction.195
Thus, under the complementarity test used in the Darfur conflict, were the
OTP to investigate the United States for detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib with a
view toward holding government and high-ranking military officials responsible
for ordering or being complicit in the abuse, it would likely have a sufficient
basis on which to conclude that the United States is unwilling genuinely to inves-
tigate or prosecute individuals at these levels of command, although it is suffi-
ciently able to do so.
There is, however, no readily apparent way for the ICC to assert jurisdiction
over potential crimes at Abu Ghraib. Because Iraq is not a State Party to the
Rome Statute, 196 it could not refer U.S. treatment of detainees to the ICC unless
it requested the Court's jurisdiction by filing a declaration with the Registrar. 97
Yet, such an action could be interpreted as a transparent political move, thus
confirming U.S. fears that the ICC would be used for politically motivated rea-
sons. 198 In the current climate, accepting jurisdiction under these circumstances
would be dangerous for a fledgling body seeking to prove its legitimacy. Fur-
ther, the newly-elected Iraqi government is heavily dependent on the United
States for military security and economic aid. 199 It is highly doubtful that it
would risk causing discord in its relationship with the United States in order to
193 Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 1, 17(3).
194 Id. arts. 8(2)(a)(ii)-(iii) (classifying torture, inhuman treatment, and willfully causing great suffer-
ing or serious bodily injury as war crimes); see also Iraq Response, supra note 100, at 8-10.
195 Id. arts. 17(1)(b), (2)(c).
196 International Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/statesparties
.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2006).
197 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 12(3).
198 Kaul, supra note 14, at 380.
199 Anthony Shadid & Steve Fainaru, Building Iraq's Army: Mission Improbable, WASH. POST FOR-
EIGN SERV., June 10, 2005, at A01; Ron Askew, Iraqis' Economic Woes Add to Desperation, REUTERS,
Mar. 21, 2006, http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=ReutersEdge&storylD=2006-03-
21TO90100Z 01_NOA 132418_RTRUKOC_0_ANALYSIS-IRAQ-ECONOMY.xml.
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seek out ICC jurisdiction and seeking investigation of detainee abuse is hardly a
priority for the heavily-burdened Iraqi government. Thus, although there is a
colorable claim that the ICC could apply its admissibility criteria to find in favor
of asserting its jurisdiction over officials allegedly responsible for abuse at Abu
Ghraib, it is highly unlikely that it will ever do so.
IV. Conclusion
Using the admissibility criteria garnered from the OTP's investigation in the
Sudan, this assessment of the U.S. interrogation policies created by administra-
tion officials and implemented by high ranking military officers reveals that the
ICC could theoretically assert its jurisdiction over the resulting allegations of
detainee abuse notwithstanding the protections of complementarity. Although
the national investigatory systems are functionally unimpeded and procedures
exist with which to investigate at all levels of authority, the United States is
unwilling to investigate up the chain of command. Because there has not been
any clearly objective attempt to investigate or prosecute high-ranking military
and government officials, the ICC could conclude that existing national efforts do
not bar it from establishing jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding this particular analysis, complementarity remains a high bar
to surpass. The United States could easily avoid ICC jurisdiction by conducting
an earnest, independent review of the abuse that occurred at Abu Ghraib that
includes an investigation into military and administration officials. Even if no
high-level prosecutions were to result from such a review, the ICC could only
seek to conduct its own investigation if the U.S. effort was found to be inconsis-
tent with the aim of bringing offenders to justice or if the ICC determined that the
national investigation was conducted for the sole purpose of shielding offenders
from its jurisdiction. 200 In a future case where crimes clearly fall within the
ICC's jurisdiction, U.S. fears of international prosecution could still only be real-
ized by an internal failure to uphold the country's international obligations.
200 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(2).
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